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. . . 
Money, it’s a gas. 
Grab that cash with both hands and make a stash. 
New car, caviar, four star daydream, 
Think I’ll buy me a football team. 
. . . 
Huhuh! I was in the right! 
Yes, absolutely in the right! 
I certainly was in the right! 
             - Pink Floyd
1 
 
The tribunal has now issued a final award, thus terminating the arbitration 
proceedings.  All of the contracts regarding the arbitration have now been largely 
performed, though certain obligations, such as confidentiality, will obviously 
continue.  The award will often entitle one of the parties to a sum of money, 
providing damages pursuant to a claim or counterclaim.  Or the award may deny 
all of the parties’ claims, but nonetheless award one of the parties a right to 
recover various costs associated with the arbitration.  In some instances, an award 
may deny any recovery at all if the tribunal denies all claims and does not make 
any award related to costs—thus leaving each party as it found itself at the 
conclusion of the arbitration.  However, even the latter award may be the subject 
of recognition for its res judicata effect in a subsequent legal proceeding between 
the parties.2  The law regarding recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
applies to both enforcement of rights to money and recognition of the award, 
itself, in other proceedings. 
 
Example 10-1 
A contract dispute has arisen over a contract for the sale of steel 
between NNM and J&G.  J&G originally commenced 
arbitration.  However, the arbitral panel ultimately determined 
that the steel delivered by NNM was fully conformed under 
                                                 
1 From the song, Money, on the album Dark Side of the Moon, by Pink Floyd (1973). 
2 The term res judicata is used here in its broad sense, including, in at least some legal systems, 
both claim and issue preclusive effects.  The nuances of issue preclusive effects of arbitral awards 
are, however, beyond the scope of this casebook. 
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Article 35, and J&G had therefore breached the parties’ 
agreement by failing to pay for the steel as required under 
Article 53.  The panel has, therefore, issued a final award 
requiring J&G to pay NNM for the steel, and further requiring 
J&G to pay the entire cost of the arbitral proceedings. 
 
In many instances, a party obligated by the final award to pay money will simply 
do so, as its final obligation under the arbitration agreement.  However, a party 
may also decline to pay the award.  This failure to pay the award may be based 
on a genuine belief that the award is in some way flawed, or it may simply be a 
matter of obstinacy or inability to pay.  In either case, court action regarding the 
award is likely. 
If the party obligated to pay money under the award has assets in the place of 
arbitration, then the process of converting the award into an enforceable money 
judgment in court is probably a relatively simple one governed by a the law of a 
single jurisdiction—the law of the place of arbitration, which is also law of the 
place of enforcement.  As such, there will likely be only one forum in which any 
issues as to the legal viability of the award will be fully and finally determined.  
However, in international sales transactions, the place of arbitration (often chosen 
for its neutrality and/or its lex arbitri) will often be different from the place of 
enforcement (likely to be the place in which one of the parties has its business 
headquarters or substantial assets).  Thus, a party’s decision to resist the effects 
of an award involving an international sales transaction will typically lead to one 
or both of two distinct categories of court proceedings that may affect the award. 
One must begin by (I) distinguishing between the basic nature of actions to set 
aside an award and actions to enforce an award.  A party seeking to attack the 
award offensively will bring (II) an action to set aside the award.  A party may 
also (III) defend against enforcement of the award in any place in which judicial 
enforcement is sought by the party entitled to relief under the award. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION TO COURT ACTIONS TO CHALLENGE OR 
ENFORCE THE ARBITRATORS’ FINAL AWARD 
First, either party may challenge the arbitrators’ decision in an appropriate court 
in the place or arbitration.3  While challenges are most often brought by the party 
required by the award to pay money, either party is entitled to challenge the 
award if it believes it has a valid basis to do so.  An action to challenge the award 
                                                 
3 The Model Law designates such a court in Article 6.  As indicated earlier, this is the City Court of 
Vindobona in Danubia, our mythical place of arbitration. 
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in the place of arbitration is called an action to “set aside”4 or “vacate” the award.  
If the challenge is successful, and the award is set aside, it will no longer have 
any legal force and effect in the place of arbitration.5 
Second, a party entitled to a remedy under the final award may bring an action to 
enforce the award in the courts of the intended place of enforcement.  Typically, 
the party entitled to receive money under the award will bring an enforcement 
action in a jurisdiction in which it believes the party obligated to pay money 
under the award has assets that can be seized or liquidated in payment of the 
award.6  Such an action to enforce the award may be brought before, or after, or 
irrespective of whether there has been any action by the other party to set aside or 
vacate the award in the place of arbitration.  If one party brings an action to 
enforce the award, the party against whom enforcement is sought may seek to 
defend against enforcement, irrespective of whether this party has sought to have 
the award set aside or vacated in the place of arbitration. 
In summary, the legal viability of an arbitration award may be addressed in: (1) a 
court action to set aside or vacate the award in the place of arbitration; (2) a court 
action to enforce the award in the place of enforcement; or (3) both.  In view of 
these two alternative, and potentially cumulative, forums in which the viability of 
the award might be addressed, one might reasonably ask whether the legal 
standards in each forum are the same or different.  If they are different, then these 
differences could make the choice of forum for any challenge outcome 
determinative or could lead to inconsistent results in multiple forums.  Is this a 
desirable effect? 
One example of such differences is found in the American Federal Arbitration 
Act.  FAA Chapter 2 formally adopts the New York Convention and its standards 
of enforceability with respect to international7 awards.  However, American 
courts typically apply the standards contained in Section 108 of FAA Chapter 1, 
                                                 
4 See Model Law Article 34. 
5 It may in some circumstances, however, continue to have legal force and effect in other 
jurisdictions outside the place of arbitration.  This is addressed more fully below. 
6 The precise nature of enforcement—i.e., creditor’s remedies and debtor’s rights—in various 
jurisdictions is beyond the scope of these materials.  These issues will typically be governed by 
national laws attempting to balance the right of creditors to be paid any monies legally owing and 
the rights of debtors to be free of certain unreasonable seizures of their assets.  Enforcement actions 
may also involve insolvency proceedings, which are again primarily subject to national laws.  
However, UNCITRAL has made some progress in the area of uniform law proposals governing 
cross-border insolvency.  See UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997). 
7 The FAA actually adopts a broad definition of “non-domestic” awards, as provided for under 
Article 1 of the New York Convention.  See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2000). 
8 There are other differences between section 10 of the FAA and Article V of the New York 
Convention beyond the “manifest disregard” standard (which is not found in the New York 
Convention or other modern arbitration law).  The others may or may not have a significant 




including the court created “manifest disregard” standard when addressing an 
action to set aside an award.  Thus, the standards in the United States for setting 
aside an award are different from the standards for enforcement.  The potential 
for conflict and confusion should be evident.  In contrast to the FAA approach, 
consider the following description of the drafting of the standards for actions to 
set aside or enforce an award included in the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
 
The History of the New York Convention, 
Pieter Sander 
. . . 
III. Harmonizing Effect of the Convention 
. . .  I would like to draw attention to the harmonizing effect the New 
York Convention has had on national arbitration legislation. This 
development was not foreseen in 1958. It is thanks to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 which virtually repeats the grounds 
for refusal of enforcement of the New York Convention in its model 
for national arbitration legislation. This was done not only for the 
grounds for the refusal of enforcement of an award but virtually the 
same grounds apply as grounds for the setting aside of an award. The 
Model Law has by now been adopted by [many] States of which 
[some] also did so for domestic arbitration. Therefore, the impact of 
the New York Convention on the Model Law has been considerable. 
. . . 
ICCA Congress Series No. 9 (Paris/1999), pp. 11 – 14. 
* * * * * 
 
The following discussion focuses primarily on the Model Law and the New York 
Convention.  As such, the emphasis in each of the two parts that follow—actions 
to set aside and actions to enforce—will focus on differences in the context of the 
two actions instead of differences in standards of legal viability.  Because the 
standards for legal viability are essentially identical, these standards can be fully 
addressed in a largely interchangeable fashion in each of the two parts that 
follow. 
 
                                                                                                                         
substantive effect, depending on how each is interpreted and applied.  However, the significant 
differences in language certainly give rise to a potential for significant interpretive differences. 
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II. DIRECT CHALLENGES BY THE DISAPPOINTED PARTY: 
OFFENSIVELY ATTACKING THE AWARD IN THE PLACE OF 
ARBITRATION 
In earlier chapters addressing arbitration as dispute resolution, contract, and 
procedure, the lex arbitri has been paramount.  Once again, in an action to set 
aside an arbitration award, the law of the place of arbitration, or lex arbitri, takes 
center stage.  The only country in which an arbitration award may be rendered 
invalid is the place of arbitration.9  While a party may resist enforcement in 
another country, any court judgment in the place of enforcement is without legal 
effect outside of that country.  However, a decision to set aside the award may, at 
least, render the award invalid and unenforceable in all countries.10  As such, the 
reviewing court in the place of arbitration has considerable power over the 
ultimate enforceability of the award.11 
Most jurisdictions provide strict time limits for any action to set aside an award.  
The Model Law generally requires that such actions be brought within three 
months of the receipt or the award.12  The (A) grounds for setting aside an award 
are quite limited.  If, however, an award is set aside, (B) this will generally 
render the award without legal force and effect, subject to one rather significant 
exception. 
 
A. GROUNDS FOR SETTING ASIDE AN AWARD 
The sole and exclusive grounds for setting aside an award under the Model Law 
are listed in subsection 2 of Article 34.  The statute provides six distinct grounds 






                                                 
9 See Model Law Article 34(1). 
10 This general proposition is, however, subject to exceptions addressed in section I.B. infra. 
11 Under the Model Law, this is the court (or courts) designated in Article 6. 
12 See Model Law Article 34(3) (providing, in the alternative, that the action be brought within 
three months of any decision disposing of any request to correct or clarify an award).  A failure to 
bring a timely action to set aside an award will not prevent a party from resisting enforcement in 
another county, but, again, a successful enforcement defense generally has a much narrower effect 
than a successful action to set aside the award. 





Application for setting aside as exclusive recourse against 
arbitral award 
. . . 
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court specified in 
article 6 only if: 
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that: 
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 
was under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not 
valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, 
failing any indication thereon, under the law of this State; or 
(ii) the party making the application was not given proper notice 
of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral 
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or 
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not 
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the 
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on 
matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those 
not so submitted, only that part of the award which contains 
decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set 
aside; or 
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a 
provision of this Law from which the parties cannot 
derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance 
with this Law; or 
(b) the court finds that: 
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement 
by arbitration under the law of this State; or 
(ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of this State. 
 
Subsection (2)(a)(i) addresses the validity of the arbitration agreement.  These are 
the same issues addressed earlier in the discussions of governing law and issues 
involving any decision on the tribunal’s jurisdiction.  In those discussions, as 
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well as the chart in Appendix C, it was suggested that validity issues must be 
addressed under the law of the place of arbitration, or lex arbitri, unless parties 
subject these issues to a different law.  If another law were applied to issues of 
validity, then the award might be subject to being set aside.  In effect, the 
tribunal’s decision as to whether the parties validly concluded an arbitration 
agreement is subject to a full court review under this provision.  Remember, 
however, the effect of separability under Model Law Article 16.  An award 
finding the container agreement invalid (or perhaps even never concluded) will 
not, by itself, render the arbitration agreement invalid. 
 
Example 10-2 
The Peruvian buyer of wool and maker of sweaters assigned to a 
Paraguayan party his contract with the New Zealand seller of 
wool.  The contract contained a provision calling for arbitration 
in Vindobona, Danubia.  If a dispute subsequently arose between 
the New Zealand seller and Peruvian buyer (as assignee), the 
Peruvian buyer might assert that she did not validly consent to 
the arbitration clause as an assignee.  In addressing this issue, a 
court hearing an action to set aside the award would likely need 
to look to the law of Danubia (absent any contrary party intent) 
in determining what effect, if any, the assignment on the contract 
had on the arbitration clause within it. 
 
Subsection (2)(a)(ii) addresses basic notice and due process requirements.  In 
essence, this provision ensures that each party was provided a full and fair 
opportunity to present its case, as required under Model Law Article 18.  While 
issues could arise under this provision in a variety of contexts, one of the most 
common is in the case of a default proceeding, as allowed under Model Law 
Article 25.  If an award is made in the absence of one of the parties, the 
reasonableness of attempts to notify the party failing to appear will often be 
determinative.  Note that this is, essentially, the only ground related to the actual 
procedure on the merits of the dispute upon which an award may be vacated, 
other than public policy grounds.  This further exemplifies the extent of 
discretion afforded the tribunal in determining the arbitral procedures, as long as 
each party is given a full and fair opportunity to present its case.13 
 
                                                 
13 A failed attempt to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator for partiality or a lack of 
independence might also be raised here as affecting a party’s opportunity to present its case. 





At respondent’s request, the tribunal appointed experts to inspect 
and examine the quality and production capacity of certain 
equipment at issue.  The inspection was attended by the experts, 
the president of the tribunal, and the claimant.  However, 
respondent did not receive notice of or attend the inspection.  In 
the award, the arbitrators relied on the expert report and 
concluded in favor of claimant.  The award likely would have 
been subject to being set aside because respondent was unable to 
present its case.  However, respondent had a full and fair 
opportunity to read the experts’ report and never objected to its 
content or asked for a re-inspection, thereby waiving its right to 
challenge the report as a basis to set aside the award.14 
 
Subsection (2)(a)(iii) focuses on the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement or 
any formal submission or agreement as to the issues to be decided.  In an 
arbitration in which the issues are formally delineated early in the proceedings, 
such as the Terms of Reference in an arbitration proceeding under the ICC 
Rules,15 such formal specifications of the issues to be determined will likely be 
controlling under this provision.  In less formal proceedings, the parties’ original 
arbitration agreement may define the scope of issues submitted to arbitration.  In 
either case, any decision in the award beyond the mandate of the arbitrators will 
be set aside.  If possible, the court may set aside only an offending portion of the 
award.  If not, the whole award may be set aside. 
 
Example 10-4 
A buyer of rubber failed to open a letter of credit in favor of 
seller, and seller commenced arbitration proceedings ultimately 
leading to an award in its favor.  However, the award was set 
aside because any award based on buyer’s failure to open a letter 
of credit was deemed outside the scope of an arbitration clause 
providing for arbitration of “all disputes as to quality or 
condition of rubber or other dispute arising under these contract 
regulations shall be settled by arbitration.”16 
                                                 
14 Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polytek Engineering Co. Ltd., 2 HKC 205, High Court of Hong 
Kong, Court of Final Appeal, Hong Kong, Feb. 9, 1999, UNCITRAL CLOUT Case 599. 
15 ICC Rules Article 18. 
16 Tiong Huat Rubber Factory (SDN) BHN v. Wah Chang International (China) Co. Ltd. & ANOR, 
Supreme Court of Hong Kong, Hong, Kong, Jan. 18, 1991, UNCITRAL CLOUT Case 675. 
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Which “contract regulations” did the court believe the parties intended in the 
arbitration clause above?  Might the court have interpreted it differently?  Should 
a tribunals and courts read arbitration clauses narrowly or broadly? 
Subsection (2)(a)(iv) focuses on the constitution of the arbitral panel.  This issue 
is governed by the parties’ agreement, including any rules adopted, and, in the 
absence of any party agreement, by the default rules of the lex arbitri.  If the 
actual constitution of the tribunal was contrary to agreement or default legal 
rules, then the tribunal’s award may be set aside.  For example, if a party is 
inappropriately precluded from exercising its right to choose an arbitrator, then 
the award might be set aside. 
 
Example 10-5 
The arbitration clause provided for three arbitrators—one 
appointed by each party and a third appointed by these two.  The 
award was set aside because the arbitrators did not act in 
accordance with the parties’ agreement when the two party-
appointed arbitrators appointed a third, but then fully delegated 
their responsibilities and requested that the third arbitrator solely 
decide the dispute.17 
 
While subsection (2)(a) requires the party seeking to set aside the award to 
“furnish proof” of the relevant grounds, subsection (2)(b) does not.  While a 
party will likely raise any ground for setting aside the award under subsection 
(2)(b), the grounds under these latter provisions typically involve matters of pure 
law and policy, as applied to the substance of the award itself, rather than factual 
allegations to be proven under the applicable law. 
Subsection (2)(b)(i) addresses the arbitrability question discussed earlier in 
Chapter 8.  Like subsection (2)(a)(i) above, this was a necessary element of any 
jurisdictional decision.  As indicated earlier, the general trend favors increasing 
arbitrability of almost any international commercial financial dispute.  This is 
particularly true in major arbitral centers.  However, this issue may arise later if 
an award is to be enforced in a country that has not embraced this trend and still 
considers various disputes implicating certain public interests to be inarbitrable. 
Subsection (2)(b)(ii) addresses public policy issues other than arbitrability (which 
is itself a particularized public policy issue).  Public policy must be distinguished 
from simply mandatory rules of law, most of which do not rise to the sort of 
                                                 
17 Fleming v. Space Homes, Ltd., Queens Bench, Alberta, Jan. 15, 1985, UNCITRAL CLOUT Case 
628. 




fundamental or essential nature of policies of sufficient public importance to 
justify setting aside an award.  Again, this distinction is typically quite well 
developed in most arbitral centers, and the grounds for setting aside an award 
based on public policy are extremely narrow.  Again, however, the issue may 
arise later if an award is to be enforced in a country that might not interpret 
“public policy” quite so narrowly. 
 
Notes and Questions 
Note 1: The reader will note that in subsection (2)(b), the focus is on the law of 
the place of arbitration.  When the context shifts from an action to set aside to an 
action for enforcement, these same two standards will reappear, but each will 
instead look to the law of the place of enforcement in determining whether the 
standard is satisfied. 
Note 2: One should also note that none of the six above described grounds for 
setting aside an arbitration award provides any basis for a review of the tribunal’s 
decision on the merits.  In fact, such a review on the merits would be inconsistent 
with the parties’ express agreement for final and binding arbitration.18  
Nonetheless, a party asking that an award be set aside (or seeking to avoid 
enforcement, as discussed below) may assert that the tribunal’s allegedly 
erroneous decision on the merits amounted to a “decision on matters beyond the 
scope of the submission to arbitration,” thereby falling under subsection 
(2)(a)(iii).19  Such arguments should be rejected, except where the award has 
decided issues that are unequivocally beyond the scope of any submission to 
arbitration.  An award should not be set aside simply because the tribunal decided 
submitted issues in a manner that has left one of the parties disappointed, as this 
would effectively make all awards subject to judicial review on the merits. 
Note 3: In some circumstances in which a party has brought an action to set aside 
an award, and it appears likely that the award is defective in some manner that is 
subject to correction, it may be possible to reconvene the tribunal.  If so, it may 
be most efficient to allow the tribunal to attempt to remedy any defect before 
completing the action to set aside the award.  Model Law Article 34(4) provides 
for such a possibility.  The court may, if requested by a party, suspend the setting 
aside proceedings for a time in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity 
                                                 
18 The importance of this point is another reason to use the specific words “final and binding” in 
any arbitration agreement. 
19 A disappointed party may argue that the parties did not give the arbitrators the “powers” to 
decide the issue in a manner that is inconsistent with settled law under Article 34(2).  Alternatively, 
a party may argue that an award inconsistent with settled law is contrary to public policy under 
subsection (2)(b)(ii).  Fortunately, the argument has met with little success.  Even the unique 
United States “manifest disregard of the law” standard is rarely employed to vacate an award. 
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to resume the arbitral proceedings or take such other action as may eliminate any 
grounds for setting aside the award.20 
 
PROBLEM 
Problem 10-1:  A and B (from Argentina and Brazil, respectively) agree to 
arbitration of a sale of goods dispute.  The agreement provides that “the tribunal 
shall make an award allowing the prevailing party to recover all of its costs 
incurred in the arbitration, including its reasonable attorney fees.”  In the final 
award, the tribunal grants to A the full amount of its claim, but expressly declines 
to make any award of costs or attorney fees.  Does B have grounds to have the 
award set aside?  What if the agreement expressly precluded the tribunal from 
making any award of costs or fees and it did so anyway.  Would this provide 
grounds for setting aside the award?  If so, does this mandate that the entire 
award be set aside? 
 
B. THE EFFECT OF A SUCCESSFUL ACTION TO SET ASIDE—OR IS THE 
AWARD STILL ENFORCEABLE? 
If an award is set aside by a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the place of 
arbitration, then the award will no longer have any legal force and effect in that 
country.  This primary proposition is clear and is subject to few, if any, 
exceptions.  Under normal circumstances, the award will also be rendered 
unenforceable in any jurisdiction, including those outside of the place of 
arbitration.  This second proposition is, however, subject to potential exception 
under certain circumstances.  One might reasonably question how an award set 
aside in one state could possibly have any effect in another state.  The answer to 
this question lies in the character of an international arbitration award and the 
language of Article VII of the New York Convention. 
While an arbitration agreement and any proceedings under that agreement are 
subject to the law of the place of arbitration, the award nonetheless possesses an 
international character.21  Moreover, the New York Convention provides only 
minimum requirements for enforcement, as Article VII.1 expressly leaves open 
the potential for broader enforcement under more favorable national law.22  
                                                 
20 Model Law Article 34(4). 
21 Cf. Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (emphasizing the 
international nature of the transaction and, thereby, taking a strong pro-arbitration view in 
determining that an action was arbitrable notwithstanding potential statutory anti-trust issues). 
22 “The provisions of the present Convention shall not . . . deprive any interested party of any right 
he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the 
law . . . of the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.”  New York 
Convention Article VII. 




Article V also makes clear that a competent court ruling setting aside an award 
allows an enforcing court to decline enforcement, but does not mandate such a 
result.23  As such, an enforcing court outside of the place of arbitration may 
choose not to give effect to a court decision setting aside the award to the extent 
that such decision is inconsistent with international norms of commercial 
arbitration and is enforceable under applicable national law. 
In the Chromalloy cases, this approach was employed by both U.S. and French 
courts to justify enforcement of an arbitration award set aside by the courts of 
Egypt, the place of arbitration.24  This idea of recognizing vacated awards is not, 
of course, without controversy.  In particular, it is important to recognize the 
right of a court in the place of arbitration to set aside an award that is inconsistent 
with its own public policy,25 and failing to respect such a decision is arguably 
contrary to general notions of comity. 
In Part III.B, below, the materials explore a more recent case in which a U.S. 
court declines to enforce an award that had been set aside by the courts of 
Columbia, the place of arbitration.  The court purported to distinguish 
Chromalloy, but there is also a very different tenor to the opinion.  Nonetheless, 
where a court in the place of arbitration sets aside an international award in a 
manner that is clearly inconsistent with well established international norms, 
there remains at least a possibility that a foreign court will decide to enforce the 
award—notwithstanding the fact that it has been set aside. 
 
III. WAITING FOR ENFORCEMENT: DEFENSIVELY RESISTING 
ENFORCEMENT ON ONE’S OWN TURF 
In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court described and generally endorsed the idea of 
comity, or respect for the judicial pronouncements of other legal systems, as a 
basis for enforcing judgments rendered by foreign courts.26  As long as the 
proceedings leading up to such foreign judgments respected basic commonly 
held notions of fairness and due process, they should generally be afforded the 
same sort of deference as those of one’s own jurisdiction.  Unfortunately, not all 
                                                 
23 “Recognition and enforcement may be refused” under the enumerated grounds in subsections (a) 
through (e) (the latter addressing awards set aside in the place of arbitration).  New York 
Convention Article V (emphasis in original). 
24 See The Arab Republic of Egypt v. Chromalloy Aeroservices, Inc., Cour d'Appel, Paris, Jan. 14 
1997 (published in 12 International Arbitration Report (1997, no. 4) pp. B-1 to B-4 (in English and 
French)) (enforcing the award based on French law); Matter of Chromalloy Aeroservices v. The 
Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996) (enforcing the award based on the U.S. 
Federal Arbitration Act). 
25 See Model Law Article 34(2)(b). 
26 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
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national courts share these views, and even those that purport to often apply the 
principle of comity in ways that are inconsistent and unpredictable at best.27 
If all courts followed the dictates of Hilton v. Guyot, the impact of the New York 
Convention might have been somewhat less dramatic.  As it is, however, the New 
York Convention, almost uniformly, makes the enforcement of foreign 
arbitration awards simpler, quicker, and considerably more certain than the 
enforcement of foreign judgments.  While actions to enforce foreign judgments 
often require state involvement and/or the preparation of “letters rogatory,” a 
sometimes complicated and lengthy process, an action to enforce an arbitration 
award is quite simple as further described below.  As such, the issue of 
enforcement provides arbitration with one of its greatest advantages over court 
adjudication.28 
Under the New York Convention, (A) the judicial enforcement of foreign 
arbitration awards is a relatively simple and straightforward process.  However, 
even under the Convention, there remain limited (B) grounds for refusing to 
enforce an award.  Perhaps the most important, and the most troublesome, 
ground for non-enforcement is (C) public policy of the country in which 
enforcement is sought. 
 
A. ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 
The centerpiece of the New York Convention, as the primary international 
instrument mandating enforcement of arbitration awards, is Article III. 
 
Article III 
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding 
and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of 
the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions 
                                                 
27 Hilton is not even necessarily followed in the United States, as the issue of enforcement of a 
foreign judgment may be governed by state law.  While many states have adopted uniform law 
generally allowing for enforcement of foreign judgments, others have taken a more restrictive 
approach, and many only enforce judgments from jurisdictions offering reciprocity in enforcement. 
28 The importance (more or less) of this single particular distinction between arbitration and court 
adjudication may become somewhat clearer in the near future.  In 2005, the Geneva Convention of 
Choice of Court Agreements was completed.  Under this Convention, forum selection clauses 
choosing specific courts would generally be treated in a manner similar to arbitration agreements, 
and judgments issued by the selected courts would be enforceable in foreign courts in much the 
same manner as arbitration awards.  The Convention has not yet entered into force, but, if widely 
adopted, it could provide parties with some interesting choices between national courts and private 
arbitrators. 




laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed 
substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges 
on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which 
this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or 
enforcement of domestic arbitral awards. 
 
Note the specific language of Article III.  International awards are enforceable, 
limited only to the terms of the Convention.  Moreover, the Convention bars an 
enforcing court from imposing any greater burden on enforcement of 
international awards than domestic awards.  Thus, an international award may be 
enforceable even under circumstances in which a domestic award is not.  
However, the mechanism for enforcement of an international award cannot be 
burdened to any greater extent than an enforceable domestic award. 
The Convention’s requirements for enforcement are relatively simple.  First, 
Article II requires a signed writing, the requirements of which were addressed in 
Chapter 8 in reference to formal validity.  Remember, in Chapter 8, the issue was 
formal validity under the lex arbitri, as a threshold jurisdictional issue.  Here the 
issue is enforceability.  The importance of UNCITRAL’s efforts to bring about 
uniform standards of interpretation of the writing requirements of Model Law 
Article 7 and New York Convention Article II should now be much clearer. 
Assuming that the formal validity requirements of Article II have been met, the 




1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the 
preceding article, the party applying for recognition and 
enforcement shall, at the time of the application, supply: 
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified 
copy thereof; 
(b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly 
certified copy thereof.  
2. If the said award or agreement is not made in an official 
language of the country in which the award is relied upon, 
the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the 
award shall produce a translation of these documents into 
such language. The translation shall be certified by an 
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official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular 
agent. 
 
Once the enforcing party has complied with the above procedural requirements, 
the enforcing court must issue a court decree making the arbitration award fully 
enforceable as a money judgment, unless the party opposing enforcement can 
prove one or more of the limited grounds for refusing enforcement. 
 
B. GROUNDS FOR REFUSING ENFORCEMENT 
The New York Convention provides for presumptive enforcement of arbitral 
awards, subject to a very limited set of grounds.  You will note in the text of New 
York Convention Article V below, that the grounds for refusing enforcement 
under the New York Convention are virtually identical to the grounds for setting 
aside an award under the Model Law.29  There are only two significant 
differences, each of which is quite logical in view of the differing context.  Take 
particular note of the ground provided in subsection 1(e), as well as the 
applicable law in each of the provisions of subsection 2. 
 
Article V 
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, 
at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if 
that party furnishes to the competent authority where the 
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: 
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, 
under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or 
the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the 
parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, 
under the law of the country where the award was made; or 
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given 
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the 
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present 
his case; or 
                                                 
29 The Model Law also addresses actions for enforcement in Article 36.  While the provisions of 
Article 36 are functionally identical to Article V of the New York Convention, these materials will 
make reference to the New York Convention and Article V in view of the much wider acceptance 
of the New York Convention on issues governing enforcement. 




(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or 
not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, 
or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the 
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on 
matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those 
not so submitted, that part of the award which contains 
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be 
recognized and enforced; or 
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance 
with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; 
or 
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has 
been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the 
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was 
made. 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also 
be refused if the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to the public policy of that country. 
 
The provisions of subsections 1(a) through 1(d) are obviously the same as those 
provided under Model Law Article 34.  Both the articulation of the relevant 
standard and the designation of the applicable law are, essentially, identical.  
Thus, any of the issues addressed in these provisions ought to result in the same 
decision—irrespective of whether determined in an action to set aside the award 
or an action to enforce the award.30 
Subsection 1(e) is the one additional provision of Article V, and its addition is 
entirely contextual.  If a competent court in the place of arbitration has set aside 
the award, then an enforcing court may decline to enforce it.  As explained 
above, a court is not required to refuse enforcement simply because the 
                                                 
30 In fact, one might even suggest that any decision of one court should have a preclusive effect on 
the decision of another court.  However, the differing nature of the two actions may provide a court 
with a basis to rule otherwise. 
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subsection 1(e) has been satisfied.  The enforcing court is, essentially, confronted 
with two competing values: (1) respect for international arbitration awards, and 
(2) respect for the judgment of a competent foreign court.  In the Chromalloy 
case, the former value prevailed.  In the case explored in the following example, 
the latter was arguably paramount. 
 
Example 10-6 
TermoRio contracted to sell energy to Electranta, an electrical 
supplier owned by the Columbian government, and the parties 
also agreed to arbitrate any disputes under the ICC Rules.  
Columbia subsequently decided to privatize Electranta and, in 
doing so, sold all of its assets without requiring the purchasers to 
assume its contractual obligations.  Without any remaining 
assets, Electranta refused to perform its contractual obligations, 
and TermoRio successfully obtained a $60 million award against 
Electranta in the arbitration proceedings.  Electranta then sought 
relief in the Columbian courts, which set aside the award 
because Columbian law did not at that time expressly permit the 
use of ICC arbitration rules.  TermoRio then attempted to 
enforce the award in U.S. courts relying on the same theory that 
had succeeded in the Chromalloy case.  This court rejected the 
reasoning of Chromalloy and, instead, on notions of comity to 
the courts of the place of arbitration.  In effect, the court stated 
that, unless the court decision, itself, violated international public 
policy, an enforcing court should refuse to enforce the award 
under New York Convention Article V.1.(e).  Inasmuch as the 
Columbian court’s decision was not, on its face, improper, the 
court declined to enforce the award.31 
 
The reader will recall the discussion of the Chromalloy case in Part I.B, in which 
the court enforced the award in favor of Chromalloy, notwithstanding the fact 
that it had been set aside by the government of Egypt.  The entire tenor of the 
Chromalloy and TermoRio decisions is different.32  Chromalloy focuses entirely 
on the importance of international commercial arbitration—particularly in 
                                                 
31 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  
32 Compare TermoRio S.A. E.S.P., 487 F.3d 928, with Matter of Chromalloy Aeroservices, 939 F. 
Supp.  907.  The court attempts, in TermoRio, to distinguish Chromalloy based on a contractual 
promise by the award debtor not to seek to set aside the award in Egyptian courts.  However, the 
Chromalloy case does not address this issue at all, and such a promise might well be ineffective as 
an ex-ante waiver of a right to judicial review.  In short, this distinction is hardly compelling. 




circumstances in which the court sets aside an award against its own government.  
The Court methodically walked through the discretionary provisions in New 
York Convention Articles V and VII and then applied the Federal Arbitration Act 
as a more pro-enforcement regime than the New York Convention under the 
circumstances of the case.  Under remarkably similar circumstances, the 
TermoRio court suggested, with little specific support from the text, that the spirit 
of the New York Convention required substantial deference to courts in the place 
of enforcement. 
While the TermoRio court did not expressly overrule the Chromalloy case, it 
certainly casts doubt upon the continuing vitality of its rationale.  The two cases 
also provide excellent examples of two very different approaches to the question 
of enforcing international arbitration awards set aside in the place of arbitration.  
In the case of an international commercial arbitration award, to whom do foreign 
enforcing courts owe the greatest degree of comity—the arbitration tribunal or 
the courts in the place of arbitration?  One might also ask if the nationality of the 
enforcing party is significant.33 
A court seized of an enforcement action may take note of a pending action to set 
aside the award in the place of arbitration.  The court in which the enforcement 
action is pending may, if it deems it proper, decide to adjourn or temporarily 
suspend the enforcement action, pending the outcome of the action to set aside 
the award.  If the award is set aside in the place of arbitration, then the enforcing 
court may decline to enforce it under subsection 1(e), perhaps avoiding a 
potentially inconsistent decision of its own.  Any such adjournment or suspension 
may, however, delay enforcement.  A court may, therefore, require the party 
opposing enforcement to provide adequate security in view of any potential delay 
in enforcement.34 
Subsection 1(e) also provides that a court need not enforce an award that is not 
yet binding in the place of arbitration. 
 
Example 10-7 
Claimant applied to enforce an award under Canada’s adoption 
of Model Law Article 35(1).  However, respondent has properly 
applied to the tribunal for correction of the award, and that 
request to the tribunal remained pending.  As such, the award 
was not yet final and binding because the tribunal remained 
                                                 
33 In Chromalloy, a United States corporation successfully enforced an award against the Egyptian 
government, even though it had been set aside by the Egyptian courts.  In TermoRio, a foreign 
corporation was denied enforcement against former assets of Electranta sold by the Columbian 
government and then located in the United States. 
34 New York Convention Article VI. 
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seized of the matter, and the award was not yet enforceable 
under Article 36(1)(a)(v) (same as NYC V.1.(e)).35 
 
The provisions of subsections 2(a) and 2(b) include the same grounds for non-
enforcement as those provided by Model Law Article 34 for setting aside an 
award.  However, the applicable law in each is different.  In an action to set aside 
an award, these provisions focus on the place of arbitration.  In an action to 
enforce the award, these provisions instead focus on the place of enforcement. 
In view of the fact that the party is seeking aid in enforcement of the award by 
the courts of place of enforcement, it would seem appropriate to consider issues 
of arbitrability and public policy under the law of that state.  However, there is 
also much opportunity for the mischief of protectionism here, which is precisely 
one of the problems that the New York Convention was intended to remedy.  The 
courts in the place of enforcement are also addressing issues under an applicable 
body of law that may not have been considered by the court in any earlier action 
to set aside—that court having considered these issues under its own law.  Thus, 
issues of public policy, generally, deserve special attention when it comes to 
questions of enforcement. 
 
C. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION:  ITS USE AND ABUSE 
The public policy exception to enforcement provides perhaps the most fertile 
grounds for court disputes.  On one hand, the exception is important in 
recognizing that a state court should not be required to enforce an award that 
“would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.”36  
On the other hand, it can sometimes be quite difficult to determine whether an 
important mandatory rule of law may rise to the level of such fundamental 
notions of public policy.  The following case addresses this question, as well as a 






                                                 
35 Relais Nordik Inc. v. Secunda Marine Services Limited and Anor, Federal Court, Trial Division, 
Canada, Apr. 12, 1990, UNCITRAL CLOUT Case 625. 
36 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société Générale de l’Industrie du Papier RAKTA 
and Bank of America, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). 




Supreme Court of Korea 
Case No. 93Da53054 
14 February 1995 
(from KluwerArbitration.com)37 
Facts 
Following a dispute between Adviso N.V. and Korea Overseas 
Construction Corp., an arbitral award was rendered in Zürich 
awarding damages to Adviso.  . . .  Adviso sought enforcement 
of the award in Korea.  . . .   
[An excerpt of the decision of the Korean Supreme Court 
(reviewing the decision of the Seoul Court of Appeals) is 
presented below] 
I. On the First Argument 
Art. IV(1) and (2) of the [1958 New York Convention] 
(hereinafter the ['New York Convention']) to which Korea 
became a party on 8 February 1973, prescribes that the party 
applying for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award has to meet the burden of proof by submitting (1) the duly 
authenticated original awards or a duly certified copy thereof and 
(2) the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy 
thereof and that, in the event that the said award or agreement is 
not made in an official language of the country in which the 
award is to be enforced, the party applying for recognition and 
enforcement of the award must produce a translation of these 
documents into such official language, certified by an official or 
sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent. 
The requirement [that] the translation of the arbitral award be 
certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or 
consular agent under Art. IV(2) of the New York Convention 
does not go so far as to require that such translation be done 
personally by any of said persons. This requirement is met if 
anyone of them duly certifies that the translation is the 
translation of the arbitral awards concerned, even though the text 
of the arbitral awards is not translated personally by any one of 
said persons. Thus, an affixation of the signature of a diplomatic 
or consular agent is not necessarily required; nor does the 
                                                 
37 KluwerArbitration.com, from the Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, vol. XXI, 612-616 (Albert 
J. van den Berg ed., 1996). 
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meaning of the term 'certified' encompass the certification of the 
accuracy of the translations. 
The Court below held that where the plaintiff-respondent 
[hereinafter 'plaintiff'] had submitted, as shown by plaintiff 
Evidence Numbers 1, 2, 7-1 and 7-2, the duly certified copy of 
the arbitration agreement and the duly certified copy of the 
arbitral award as well as the translations which had been duly 
certified by diplomatic agents concerned, the arbitral award was 
enforceable in Korea in the absence of the reasons for refusal as 
provided under Art. V(1) and (2) of the New York Convention. 
We are persuaded that the decision of the Court below is correct 
and do not agree that the Court below erred in its interpretation 
of said provision. We reject this argument. 
. . . 
[The second argument is omitted] 
. . . 
III. On the Third Argument 
The Court below noted that in this case the defendant did not 
argue that the arbitration agreement was void ad initio, but that, 
since the contract incorporating the arbitration agreement clause 
had been assigned to a third party, the assignor forfeited its right 
as a party to the arbitration, or the arbitration clause in the 
agreement was not valid between the original parties. The Court 
held that, in such cases, the validity of the arbitration agreement 
was to be judged by the arbitral tribunal, since such an issue was 
unavoidably tied to the merits of the arbitration. 
Upon review of the award, the Court below found that the 
arbitration tribunal had decided in its majority opinion that, 
recognizing that the governing law of the alleged assignment 
should be the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which was 
most closely related to that assignment, the assignment was not 
valid under the law of Saudi Arabia in consideration of the views 
of the Committee for Settlement of Commercial Disputes of the 
Ministry of Justice of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 
Saudi Arabian National Center for Science and Technology. 
Then, the Court below rejected this defendant's argument 
because, since there were some ambiguities in the choice of the 
governing law and fact-findings, the arbitration award should be 
respected and not be reviewed by the courts of the country in 




which the enforcement is sought, unless accepting the 
interpretations of the arbitral tribunal was contrary to the 
fundamental moral principles and concept of justice in Korea. 
On review of the records, we conclude that the findings and 
holdings of the Court below were reasonable and do not agree 
that the Court below failed to fully try this case in violation of 
the rules of evidence or that the Court below incorrectly 
interpreted Art. V(1)(a) of the New York Convention. We reject 
this argument. 
IV. On the Fourth Argument 
Art. V(2)(b) of the New York Convention provides that the 
competent court in the country where recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitral award is sought may refuse such 
recognition and enforcement if such court finds that the 
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country. The basic tenet of this provision is 
to protect the fundamental moral beliefs and social order of the 
country where recognition and enforcement of the award is 
sought from being harmed by such recognition and enforcement. 
As due regard should be paid to the stability of international 
commercial order, as well as domestic concerns, this provision 
should be interpreted narrowly. (citation omitted). When foreign 
legal rules applied in an arbitral award are in violation of 
mandatory provisions of Korean law, such a violation does not 
necessarily constitute a reason for refusal. Only when the 
concrete outcome of recognizing such an award is contrary to the 
good morality and other social order of Korea, will its 
recognition and enforcement be refused. 
The Court below held firstly, that the fact that the period of 
statute of limitations under the law of the Netherlands Antilles 
applied in this arbitral award was thirty years and this period was 
longer than that under the mandatory provisions of the Korean 
law, did not necessarily render the enforcement of this award in 
violation of the public order of Korea; secondly, that the 
determination of the arbitral tribunal that it had jurisdiction 
because the right of the plaintiff to the defendant on the know-
how contract made on 8 November 1978 was not assigned to 
SECRC, was not in violation of the principle of estoppel or the 
public order of Korea; thirdly, that the allegation that the 
plaintiff blackmailed and exercised undue influence on the 
defendant was not supported by evidence (defendant's Evidence 
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Numbers 7-1 and 2, and Number 8, submitted in support of this 
claim, were only letters from the plaintiff or its representatives 
demanding royalty payments). Also the Court below added that 
the contract was not unfair even if the contract was biased 
against the defendant and that the plaintiff's delay in asserting its 
right did not amount to an abuse. Thereby, the Court below 
rejected all the arguments claiming violations of the public order. 
On review of the records, we conclude that these findings and 
holdings of the Court below are reasonable and do not agree that 
the Court below erred in applying Art. V(2)(b) of the New York 
Convention. We reject this argument. 
. . . 
* * * * * 
 
Notes and Questions 
Note 1: Note the context of the case.  The Korean party is the one opposing 
enforcement.  This will often be the case, as a party is attempting to avoid 
enforcement in its home jurisdiction.  The possible temptations for protectionism 
by the courts are of course obvious.  This court appears to do an admirable job of 
avoiding such temptations. 
Note 2: Note the court’s statement that the public policy exception must be 
interpreted narrowly in order to achieve the stability in international commercial 
transactions intended under the New York Convention.  The court goes on to say 
that a mandatory rule of law does not necessarily rise to the level of a public 
policy justifying non-enforcement.  Instead, only harm to the fundamental moral 
beliefs and social order of the enforcing state will justify non-enforcement under 
the Convention’s public policy exception.  What sort of elements of an award 
might violate a state’s fundamental moral beliefs and social order? 
Private international law generally draws a distinction between mandatory legal 
rules and issues involving ordre public.  “Mandatory rules” are generally 
considered to be those legal rules of a state whose law would unequivocally 
govern a given transaction in the absence of party choice, from which the parties 
cannot derogate, either by choosing their own terms or by choosing the rules of 
another legal system.38  Mandatory rules of another closely connected state, 
                                                 
38 See e.g. Rome Convention Article 3.  The choice of a given law will also likely subordinate any 
of the parties’ own specific terms to any “mandatory rules” within the chosen body of law. 




including the forum, may also be given effect depending on the circumstances.39  
However, a judicial forum may always give effect to its public policy (or ordre 
public) where any otherwise applicable rule is “manifestly incompatible with” 
that public policy.40 
Even public policy may be subject to its own gradations.  For example, domestic 
public policy is often distinguished from international public policy, the latter of 
which is considerably more limited than the former.41  While such international 
public policy continues to find its source in the relevant domestic legal order, it is 
interpreted far more narrowly in view of its application to an international 
transaction.  One could even further narrow the content of public policy by 
looking to transnational or “truly international public policy” as that having 
virtually universal application.42  Such a public policy definition would be 
comparable to that of jus cogens in public international law.  Most national courts 
interpret the public policy exception under the New York Convention based on 
the middle definition above—“international public policy” or “international 
ordre public” as a very narrow interpretation of domestic public policy concerns, 
as applied to international business transactions. 
While the various national determinations of international public policy are often 
difficult to define with any precision, they are relegated to a very narrow and 
limited range of issues.  Recognizing legitimate international public policy 
exceptions is perhaps a bit like recognizing pornography.  While U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Potter Stewart admitted he could not quite define it precisely, he 
stated with assurance that “I know it when I see it.”43 
 
Example 10-8 
Parties submitted disputes arising from a contract for the sale of 
steel wire to the ICC for arbitration.  The arbitrators determined 
the seller was entitled to damages and further determined in 
accord with French law that the interest rate on the award should 
increase by 5% two months after the award was issued.  Under 
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, a United States 
                                                 
39 See e.g. Rome Convention Article 7.  Certain mandatory rules of the forum may also be given 
particular deference to the extent that a state is being asked to serve as a forum for resolution of the 
dispute in question. 
40 See e.g. Rome Convention Article 16. 
41 See e.g. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
42 Audley Sheppard, Interim Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International 
Arbitration Awards (2003) (available at kluwerarbitration.com). 
43 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).  A similar analogy has been used by Professor Park in 
addressing abusive practices in arbitration, generally.  See William W. Park, Arbitration of 
International Business Disputes 222 n. 1 (Oxford U. Press 2006). 
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court refused to enforce interest on the award—to the extent of 
the 5% increase.  The court ruled that the increased interest was 
penal rather than compensatory and, therefore, violated public 
policy.44 
 
Did U.S. District Court above determine “public policy” under Article V(2)(b) in 
the same manner as the Korean Supreme Court in the case above?  If not, is there 
some distinction that might be drawn between the two cases in justifying the 
different approach by the U.S. court, or is this simply a case of protectionism? 
 
Example 10-9 
A party resisting enforcement of an award in Hong Kong 
claimed that a key witness had been kidnapped by the other party 
and was only released when he agreed to alter his testimony 
before the tribunal.  The Hong Kong High Court determined that, 
if proven, these factual allegations would preclude enforcement 
of the award under Article V(2)(b).  The court stated that the 
enforcement of an award made on basis of such fraudulently 
procured testimony would be a violation of public policy.45 
 
Did the Hong Kong High Court above give an appropriately narrow construction 
to “public policy” in reaching its decision?  Presumably, almost any state would 
reach a similar decision on these facts.  However, could the court have grounded 
its decision on any other provisions of Article V? 
Perhaps both the challenges and potential value of the public policy exception are 
best expressed by the statements of two different English judges.46  On one hand, 
public policy is “a very unruly horse, and when you get astride it you never know 
where it will carry you.  It may lead you from sound law [and] it is never argued 
at all, but when other points fail.”47  On the other hand, “with a good man [or 
woman] in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control.”48  When properly 
and narrowly directed, the public policy exception to enforceability under the 
                                                 
44 See Laminoires-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1065 (N.D. Ga. 
1980). 
45 JJ. Agro Industries Ltd., v. Texuna Intl. Ltd., [1994] 1 HKLR 89, High Court, Hong Kong, May 
29, 1992. 
46 This comparison is drawn from Audley Sheppard, Interim Report on Public Policy as a Bar to 
Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards (2003) (kluwerarbitration.com). 
47 Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 228 (1824). 
48 Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v. The Football Association Ltd., [1971] Ch. 591 at 606. 




New York Convention prevents an appropriate safety valve to avoid the use of 
public courts in a manner that is truly contrary to a nation’s most basic and 
fundamental notions of morality and justice. 
 
PROBLEMS 
Problem 10-2:  A U.S. seller obtained an arbitration award against a U.S. 
consumer (pursuant to an arbitration clause in a contract of sale) and sought to 
enforce the award in France where the consumer had significant assets.  The law 
of France includes a mandatory rule making such ex ante arbitration clauses 
unenforceable.49  Should a French court decline enforcement of the award as a 
matter of “public policy”? 
Problem 10-3:  A Chinese seller of goods brought an arbitration action against a 
Saudi buyer in Geneva, under the Swiss Rules.  The tribunal issued an award, 
first determining that the CISG governed the transaction, and further determining 
that buyer’s asserted grounds for avoidance under Article 49(1)(a) did not 
amount to a fundamental breach under Article 25.  The tribunal, therefore, 
granted the Chinese seller’s claim for the unpaid price of the goods (buyer 
proved no damages) under Article 74 and also awarded interest under Article 78.  
Interest is considered “riba” under the Shari’a, Saudi Islamic law, and is barred 
by the Koran to the extent that it is based on payment of money by one person for 
the use of the money of another.50  First, is Saudi Arabia a CISG contracting 
state?  Why would the tribunal apply CISG Article 78 here?  Is the award 
enforceable in Saudi Arabia (Saudi Arabia is a New York Convention 
contracting state).  If a tribunal is uncertain as to whether an award might be 
enforced under such circumstance, how might any claim of interest be addressed 
in the award? 
 
                                                 
49 See France, in International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration 7 n. 6. (Albert J. van den 
Berg & Jan Paulsson eds., Kluwer L. Intl. & Intl. Council Commercial Arb., updated through Apr. 
2007). 
50 But see ICC Case 7063 of 1993.  In a case between two Saudi parties, the majority of a split ICC 
panel awarded an amount calculated only to compensate the party entitled to damages for losses 
caused by effects of inflation between the time of the harm and the time of the award (i.e., no 
compensation was awarded as a charge for the use of the money).  While the majority of the panel 
thought that such an additional award solely intended to offset inflation did not violate the doctrine 
of riba, the dissenting panel member did not agree. 
